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Abstract
How do parents choose among schools when they are allowed to do so? In
this paper, we analyze detailed information of 70,000 fourth-graders attending
about 1,200 publicly subsidized schools in the context of the Chilean voucher
system. We model the school choice of a household as a discrete choice of a single
school, based on the random utility model developed by McFadden (1974) and
the speciﬁcation of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), which includes choice-
speciﬁc unobservable characteristics and deals with potential endogeneity. Our
results imply that households value some attributes of schools, with the two most
important dimensions being test scores and distance to school. Interestingly, at the
same time, our results suggest there is a lot of heterogeneity in preferences because
the valuation of most school attributes depend on household characteristics. In
particular, we ﬁnd that while proximity to school is an inferior attribute, test scores
is a normal attribute. We present evidence that our results are mainly driven by
self-selection and not by school-side selection. As a ﬁnal check, we compute the
average enrollment elasticity with respect to all school attributes and ﬁnd that
higher elasticities are correlated with higher supply of the attribute, especially in
the case of test scores-enrollment elasticities for private schools.
JEL Classiﬁcation numbers: I20, I21, I22, I28
Keywords: School choice, Chile, Vouchers, Structural Estimates, Parental
Preferences.
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11 Introduction
How do parents choose among schools when they are allowed to do so? Do they con-
sider quality? prices? distance? The basic motivation for this paper is to study the
determinants of parents' choices among dierent schools. This line of research is partic-
ularly interesting from both a theoretical and a policy perspective because it allows to
know how students are allocated to schools in equilibrium and therefore infoms about
potential eects of school choice.
We extend this literature by using detailed information on the school choices in
Chile in the Metropolitan Area of Santiago. Our sample covers about 70,000 fourth-
graders attending about 1,200 publicly subsidized schools. This case is particularly
interesting because (i) Chile is a developing country having a quasi-voucher system
operating for more than two decades in the complete educational system, and (ii) there
is a lot of heterogeneity in household characteristics (eg., income, education, preferences
for the teaching of values, et cetera) that may allow us to identify variation in household
preferences for dierent school attributes.
Also extending the current literature, we model the school choice of a household as
a discrete choice of a single school based on the random utility models developed by
McFadden (1974) and the specication of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). We al-
low the choice to depend on (i) an unobserved (for us) school eect, which is common
to all students, and (ii) interactions between the set of observed school attributes and
student characteristics such as household income, mother's education and age, gender,
preferences for the teaching of values, and a proxy for parents' expectations of stu-
dent potential. In addition, we use an IV estimator to deal with potential endogeneity
problems of the price and quality coecients.
Our results imply that while households value some characteristics of schools (such
as average test scores, the teaching of values in the school, the discipline of the school,
the gender composition of the school, the school price, and a measure of the distance and
1accessibility of the school from each household), the families seem to mainly face a trade-
o between distance and test scores. Namely, our results suggest that the attributes
with the highest valuations are test scores and distance to school: in the rst case, a one
standard-deviation increase in test scores is valued at about $9 of monthly copayment
(which represents an increase of the average copayment by about 66%), and in the case
of distance a one standard deviation increase (roughly, a 2 Km decrease in distance or
5 minutes decrease in traveling time) is valued at about $11 of monthly copayment.
The other estimates seem to have relatively smaller monetary valuations. Interestingly,
our results also suggest that the valuation of each characteristic depends on household
characteristics. The main result being that while proximity to school seems to be an
inferior attribute (an increase in income decreases its demand), test scores are a normal
or superior attribute.
Our methodology relies on the assumption that parents choose among available
schools. In reality, schools also tend to select students. We present some evidence
that the determinants of school choice do not vary in a signicant way if we compare
highly selective schools with the other schools (selectivity is measured using two proxies:
the number of students in the school1 and the percentage of parents that report to have
been subject to a number of practices that may produce selection when applying to the
schools, such as interviews, student tests, proofs of religious aliation, etc.). This result
suggests that the patterns we identify in the data are more correlated with demand than
with supply decisions. Putting it dierently, these results imply that the patterns of
choice we identify are driven more by self-selection than by school selection.
In addition, we present an application in which we study the correlation between the
implicit enrollment responses faced by each school when moving dierent attributes and
the oered level of each attribute (this exercise is closely related to the one proposed by
Bayer and McMillan, 2005). As expected, we nd that schools 'react' to high elastic-
1McEwan and Urquiola (2005) present evidence that big public schools in Chile tend to have students
with more educated parents. Our interpretation of this result is that schools facing excess demand select
the students with lower (expected) education costs in the context of a at voucher.
2ities of a particular attribute by increasing the supply of the attribute in equilibrium.
Moreover, our results suggest that some of the attributes seem to respond a lot to the
demand elasticity for them. In particular, increasing the test scores-enrollment elasticity
by one standard deviation increases test scores oered by the school by about 0.11 stan-
dard deviations (in our preferred specication, which includes controls for socioeconomic
characteristics of the students attending the school). Most of the other attributes react
in a positive way but the eects are smaller than the eect on average test scores. We
also present some evidence that suggests that public schools actually do not react to
enrollment elasticities.2
This is not the rst paper studying the valuation of dierent attributes in the con-
text of dierent educational systems and, in particular, in the case of the Chilean quasi-
voucher system. A few papers have analyzed this topic using: mixed logit models with
information about rst and second choices in a particular market (e.g. Hastings, Kane,
Staiger, 2005; Hastings, and Weinstein, 2007), structural choice models using informa-
tion on a particular area (e.g. Bayer, Ferreira, McMillan, 2004; Bayer, McMillan, 2005),
discrete choice models for the choice between dierent types of schools (i.e. Checchi
and Jappelli, 2004 for Italy; Chumacero, G omez, and Paredes, 2008 and Sapelli and
Torche, 2000 for Chile), reduced-form models to estimate the determinants of the ows
of students to dierent counties (Elacqua, 2009; Gallego and Hernando, 2008), and sur-
vey results to understand the decision process among dierent schools (Elacqua et al.,
2006)..
This paper contributes to this literature in several dimensions. First, we study a
large scale experiment with school choice after about 20 years of operation and with a
lot of heterogeneity in dierent dimensions. We explicitely exploit this heterogeneity in
2We develop a dierent application of the estimates presented in this paper in Gallego and Hernando
(2008). Using the estimates of this paper, (i) we perform a number of exercises aimed at quantifying
what we call the \value of choice" (i.e. how much do households gain from a school choice system?)
against a number of counterfactuals that restrict school choice in several dimensions (geographic choice,
the existence of top ups, and the supply of voucher schools); and analyzing the eects on socioeconomic
segregation of students and (ii) we study the potential eects of introducing a non-at voucher that is
decreasing in students' SES.
3the context of a semi-structural model. Second, we use an IV approach that allows us
to obtain estimates of parents preferences that are robust to endogeneity in the price
determination and to miss-measurement of test scores. Third, we show that our results
are robust to potential baises coming from selection from the school-side.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of the
Chilean education system with especial emphasis on factors aecting school choice.
Section 3 presents the basic data sources and some stylized facts that motivate our
econometric model. Next, Section 4 presents our econometric model to identify the de-
terminants of the allocation of students to school and Section 5 presents the results of
our estimates of preference parameters. Next, Section 6 presents a simple theoretical
motivation to link the estimated marginal eects of each attribute with the supply of
each attribute at the school level and the eects of the estimated marginal eects on the
supply of attributes at the school level. Finally Section 7 briey concludes.
2 School Choice in the Chilean Education System3
To understand the Chilean system is useful to start by comparing it to the previous
system. Before the quasi-voucher system was established in 1981, public schools de-
pended from the central government and received funds independent of the number of
students that actually attended the school. Parents could choose to opt out from the
public system and have two main alternatives: paid private schools that charged high
fees and free private schools. These private schools received some discretional funds
from the government that covered a part of their operating costs (equivalent to 50% of
the costs of similar public schools). In 1981, the government implemented a reform that
included: (i) transfering public schools from the central to the local governments (mu-
nicipalities); (ii) giving total freedom to parents to apply to any free private and public
school that would receive a per-student subsidy (voucher) depending on enrollment; and
3This section is based on Gallego (2006).
4(iii) establishing free entry to the school market. In addition, the value of the subsidy
received per student increased signicantly (30% for public schools and 160% for free
private schools).4
In this context, free private schools expanded dramatically. Before the reform, free
private schools enrolled about 7% of the school-age population (estimates using data
from the 2002 Social Protection Survey).Free private schools increased enrollment to
about 10% of the school age population on impact and converged to enroll about 42%
of students in 2005. Public school enrollment dropped from about 73% in 1981 to 49%
in 2005.5
Public and voucher schools present important dierences in terms of their incentive
structures and the amount of non-voucher resources they receive. Voucher schools tend
to behave like prot maximizing rms, receiving revenues proportional to enrollment.
While some voucher schools are operated by for-prot rms, other voucher schools are
operated by non-for-prot organizations that raise additional funds in a relatively com-
petitive market for donations to be spent in schools (Aedo, 1998).6 In contrast, public
schools work under \softer" budget constraints: when needed, public schools that are
losing students receive transfers, above and beyond the vouchers to pay their expenses
(Gallego, 2006; Sapelli, 2003). In addition, while vouchers were the only public in-
tervention in the K-12 sector over the 1980s, governments during the 1990s channeled
additional resources to \vulnerable" schools and increased non-voucher spending. Gal-
lego (2006) estimates that about 30% of public expenditure in education for the average
student is not related to the voucher (data for 2002). In addition, some programs operate
more as supply subsidies to schools and, therefore, limit the mobility of students across
4This value is computed as follows. The initial value of the voucher was 30% higher than expenditure
per student in public schools before the reform. Before 1981, private schools received on average 50%
of public schools expenditure per-student (Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006). Therefore, the nominal value of
the voucher increased by 160% for private schools.
5The remaining enrollment corresponds to non-voucher private schools, which we do not include in
our sample.
6Gregory Elacqua estimates that about 63% (58%) of voucher school students were enrolled in for-
prot schools in 1998 (1992).
5schools. For instance, Sapelli and Torche (2001) present evidence that free-lunch public
programs tend to decrease mobility across schools because poor students cannot move
with their free lunches to other schools.7 Therefore, these programs tend to actually
create segregation of poor students in some schools.
In terms of other dierences among schools, voucher schools tend to have more
freedom in terms of input choice, selection policies, and price determination. Public
schools are restricted in the copayments they can charge, especially in primary schools
and must be open to receive any student as long as they have spare capacity. The
last part of the previous statement is key to understand selection in the Chilean case.
Schools (both voucher and public) with excess demand tend to select "better" students
because they receive the same voucher irrespective of the characteristics of the students
they receive (McEwan and Urquiola, 2005 present evidence that is consistent with the
existence of selection policies in public schools that are over-subscribed).8 In terms of
price policies, in our dataset, while 77.6 percent of public school students attend \free
schools" (i.e. schools that don't requiere a copayment on top of the voucher), only 24%
of voucher school students attend free voucher schools.
In terms of selection policies, Contreras et al. (2007) report that while 5% of students
attending public schools were applied some pre-entry exam, 48% of students in voucher
schools took a pre-entry exam. In terms of socioeconomic information, almost no school
asked the parents for proofs of their income, but 23% of parents of students in voucher
schools had a pre-entry interview in the school (the same number for public schools is
1%). This evidence shows that while it is true that voucher schools tend to have more
freedom to choose students than public schools, selection for academic purposes covers
less than 50% of voucher schools (and at the same time, public schools do have selection
7In Chile, free lunches are associated with schools (through the socioeconomic characteristics of its
students) and not directly with students. In estimations not reported in this paper, we investigated
whether the share of students receiving free lunch aects the likelihood of attending a school and found
no evidence of such eect. There are only some eects for poor parents and children with young mothers,
these eects point in the same general direction found by Sapelli and Torche (2001).
8Currently, there is a law proposal to make the application of any selection process, other than a
lottery, illegal for any school that receives voucher payments.
6processes).
Two recent surveys applied to representative samples help us understand the con-
sequences of these potentially selective policies on actual allocation of students. First,
a 2006 survey by the Centro de Estudios P ublicos (CEP) reports that 93 percent of
parents say that their children attend the school they want them to attend. Second,
Gallego et al. (2008) report that the mean number of applications that parents make is
about 1.1 (which increases to about 1.25 in Santiago), and about 4 percent of parents
say their children were not accepted to a school to which they applied. While survey
data certainly have important problems, the order of magnitude of these results suggests
that the observed stratication in the Chilean voucher system (documented by Hsieh
and Urquiola, 2006) may be a consequence of self-selection or selection from the demand
side, rather than from the supply side.
Overall, this description of the Chilean system suggests a lot of heterogeneity in
schools in terms of characteristics, price, participation in public programs, selection
policies, and the incentives and the input choice freedom they have.
3 Data and Stylized Facts
We use several datasets in this paper. Table 1 presents the variables used, the level
at which each variable is collected, and the descriptive statistics of each variable. We
use data on students' educational outcomes, their backgrounds, parent preferences, and
school characteristics from the dataset of the 2002 SIMCE (Sistema de Medici on de la
Calidad de la Educaci on) test, which was administered to 4th graders. Only the 2002
SIMCE test has information on both the county in which the student lives and the
county in which the student attends school, so we only can use detailed socioeconomic
information from the 2002 survey. We also use information on test scores and selection
procedures from the 2005 SIMCE test in some regressions.
We use the school average of the Math and Spanish portions of the test (standardized
7to have an average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1) as our measure of academic
outcomes (we present results using the 2002 test, but results are qualitatively similar
using the average of several years). We use income per household member and mother's
education to measure the socioeconomic background of students and the average of these
variables at the school level as measure of the socioeconomic characteristics of schools.
We also use the age of the mother, the student gender, and a proxy for preferences for
teaching of values to capture other student specic factors that may aect preferences.
Finally, we use a dummy that takes a value of 1 if parents expect their children to attain
more than high school as a proxy for parents' student expectations.
To measure other attributes of the school, we use the average at the school level
of the following variables: a proxy for the use of discipline measures in the school, the
copayment students pay, and a proxy for the teaching of religious values. In addition,
we include a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the school is a single-gender school, a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the school participates in a government-funded
extended-time program, and proxies for the extent of supply-side selection procedures
in the school and the size of the school.
We use information on the distance from each school to the centroid of the county
in which they live. This variable measures the linear distance of each school to the
most populated place in a county.9 Therefore, this variable is an imperfect proxy for
the distance of the place where a student lives to all the schools. In addition, we also
compute the distance from each school to a subway station and, using this information,
create a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the school is less than 500 meters10 from a
subway station.11
9We do not have information on the within county distribution of the population, thus our assumption
is that areas that are more dense in terms of street intersections are also likely to be more dense in
population so we calculate the centroid giving equal weight to each intersection. Our GIS have some
information about whether the intersection is in a residential, commercial, or industrial zone, but those
data showed up to be too noisy to be of any help.
10In Santiago, that translates to something like four blocks.
11We try to implement a similar measure of distance to public transportation, the problem is that
in Santiago in 2002, all schools were located close to some public transportation option and, therefore,
this variable was not very informative.
8We also use other sources of data in some empirical exercises, some of which are
not reported but are available from the authors upon request. Data on participation
in several government programs come from information available at the Ministry of
Education website.
The top panel of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics at the student level. The
average student travels about 2.44 kilometers to get to school, with the student located in
the 95th percentile of the distribution travelling about 6.5 kms. This implies an average
travel time of about 7 minutes using public transportation in 2002.12 Interestingly,
while only about 25% of parents have more than secondary education, about 60% of
them expect their children to get a post-secondary degree.
Next, Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main group of attributes we use
at the school level. Results suggest a high variance of most school attributes. In addi-
tion, this table allows us to characterize the school population we use in the regressions.
The median school has parents with a monthly per-capita income of about $64.4, with a
median copayment of less than $5 (or less than 10% of the per-capita income). The dis-
tribution of the copayment is highly bimodal, with about 50% of the students attending
free schools. Median education is 9.9 years and the schools with the maximum levels
have only parents who are high school graduates. In the median school, the teaching
of values is very low, and only 6% of schools are single-gender. The same fraction of
schools is located close to a subway station.
Table 2 presents information of some school attributes splitted by student and house-
hold characteristics (in the case of continuous variables we split the sample between those
among and bellow the median of the variable). This table shows how households with
dierent characteristics are associated with dierent school attributes. The most impor-
12The data on travel times comes from the 2001 Mobility Survey available at
http://www.sectra.cl/contenido/biblioteca/Documentos/EOD2001.zip This sruvey reports the
whole-day modal average speed for public transportation to be around 23 kilometer per hour. Since
most travels to schools occur during rush hour and most travels from school at o-peak hours, the
average underestimates the rst and overestimates the second. Nevertheless, we feel that the rst one
(time traveling from home to school) is likely to be more important for household decision making.
9tant features we would like to highlight here are: (i) SIMCE test scores increase with
education and income; (ii) students tend to attend schools with similar peers, at least in
terms of income, and preferences for the teaching of values; (iii) more educated parents
tend to spend more money in the school and their children are more likely to travel
more; (v) girls are more likely to attend one-gender schools in comparison to boys; (vi)
older mothers tend to send their children to schools with better test scores, but not with
better peers; (vii) older mothers tend to prefer schools with extended hours, and (vii)
parents with high expectations on the attainment of their children tend to travel more,
pay more, and get schools with better test scores and peers. Obviously, the correlation
among various household characteristics is high and, therefore, this information just
present stylized facts that have be studied in a multivariate framework, as we do in the
next sections.
Overall, results presented in Tables 1 and 2 present suggestive evidence that dierent
students (in socioeconomic dimensions) are allocated in equilibrium to dierent schools.
We propose an econometric methodology to study to what extent these dierences are
related to preferences for school attributes.
4 Econometric Model
We model the school choice of a household as a discrete choice of a single school. The
utility function specication is based on the random utility model developed by McFad-
den (1974) and the specication of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), which includes
choice-specic unobservable characteristics. In this section we present a detailed de-
scription of the implementation of this idea in the context of school choice in Chile.
Let Xj = fxj1;xj2;:::;xjKg represent the set of observable characteristics (including
monthly co-payment and test scores) of school j 2 f1;2;:::;Jg respectively, let dij
represent the distance from the centroid of the county of household i 2 f1;2;:::;Ig to





ikxjk + idij + j + "ij (1)
where j is the unobserved (by the econometrician) quality or characteristic of school j
that is valued exactly the same by all households and is known to both, school owner
and household. The "ij term is an individual-specic preference shock for school j. This
last term is assumed to have a extreme value Type I distribution and is known by the
household only.
The valuation of school's characteristics is allowed to vary with household's own
characteristics Zi = fzi1;zi2;:::;ziRg according to:
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we get
uij = j +
X
rk
rkzirxjk +  dij +
X
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rzirdij + "ij (5)
Households are assumed to choose the school that maximizes (5). Notice that, since j
is known to both, the school owner (or administrator) and the household, it is likely to
be correlated with school characteristics, particularly, co-payment and test scores. This
is the reason why we cannot estimate (4) directly and obtain consistent estimators. We
follow a two step approach closely related with the one introduced by Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes (2004).
114.1 First Step
Under our sustained assumption that "ij has a extreme value Type I distribution, the
probability that household i will choose school j (i.e. the probability that uij  uiq8q 6=
j) is given by the standard formula in McFadden (1974):13

























where the second product is over the set Aj of households that actually choose school j.
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where sm is the share of students that attend school m and I is the total number of
students.
















The last condition implies that the estimated m has to guarantee that the empirical
share of students attending school m has to be equal to the average probability that a
student attends this school.
In order to nd estimates for the parameters of interest, for given values (;  ;)
and a starting guess t of , we can calculate P t
ij = Pij(;  ;;t) from (6) and a
















notice that each iteration over (11) requires a new calculation of the probabilities given
by (6).
With this iterative solution for  our rst step consists of nding a solution for
problem (10). We perform a nonlinear search over the space (;  ;). The advantage of
13this method is that, while  and  are of size RK and R respectively,  is of size J, since
we have R = 6 household characteristics and K = 9 school characteristics (including
distance) and J = 1100+ schools, this greatly reduces the dimensionality of the space
over which we have to perform the nonlinear search.
Notice that we do not need to make any assumption about the join distribution of j
and  . A potential alternative could have been to make an assumption about the join
distribution of j and   and perform a direct search over ( ;;  ;). The problem with
this approach is that, if our distributional assumption is wrong, it will produce biased
estimators for both   and , while our two step method provides us with unbiased
estimators for (;  ;) at the end of the rst step.14
4.2 Second Step
The second step is the estimation of equation (4), ie. the "school eect" on the observed
characteristics of the school. Since our concern with this equation is that the some
school characteristics as price (co-payment) and test scores may capture part of the
unobserved quality characteristic of the school (j) then the price and test score variables
will be endogenous, so ordinary least squares estimation will render biased estimators. In
addition, test scores may also suer from measurement error and, therefore, coecients
on this variable may suer from attenuation bias.
Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), to the extent that schools decide
some of their attributes strategically (in our case, we are particularly worried about
co-payments and test scores), then the price charged and test scores produced by one
school will be correlated with the characteristics of other schools in the choice set. If
we assume that the unobservable j is mean independent of the (non-price and non-test
14Moreover, since iteration over (11) ensures that @L
@m = 0 then the gradient of L with respect to
rk (k) has an analytical closed form and gradient-based optimization techniques (e.g. the Newton-
Raphson method) can be used. This greatly reduces the computational burden of the optimization
in (10). In practice we rst search over (;  ;) using a gradient method and afterwards, using that
solution as a starting point, we perform a ner search for an optimum using the Nelder-Mead Simplex
method. See the appendix for additional details.
14scores) observed school characteristics (Wj = Xj n fPj;Tjg):
E[jjWj] = 0
then the non-price, non-test score characteristics of other schools can be used as instru-
ments in the estimation of equation (4) and standard IV techniques can be used in this
second step.
We consider various sets of instruments: from using all the variables included in Wj
for the six closest schools to just using the variables of the closest school. The actual set
of instruments used does not change the conclusion that IV estimates are statistically
dierent than OLS estimates (and, therefore, preferable), and, therefore, we just present
estimates for the six closest schools.
5 Determinants of Choice of School: Results
Table 3 presents the results of estimating (4) using data on the decisions of all fourth-
graders attending school in the Metropolitan Area of Santiago in 2002. As a benchmark,
colum (1) presents OLS estimates. Next, column (1) present IV estimates using all the
variables included in Wj for the six closest schools.
It is interesting to start by comparing the OLS and IV estimates. In the case of
the estimate of the eect of co-payments on school choice, as expected, the OLS esti-
mates are lower in absolute value than IV estimates, suggesting that there is a positive
correlation between the price charged by schools and the unobserved school attribute
j and/or copayments are measured with error and, therefore, there might be some at-
tenuation bias. Similarly, the OLS estimate of the eect of test scores on school choice
is smaller than the IV estimate, suggesting that a potential attenuation bias due to
miss-measurement is more important than a potential positive correlation between test
scores and the unobserved attribute j.
15Estimates in Table 3 suggest that schools with higher test scores, higher levels of
discipline, and located closer to subway stations are preferred by parents and, therefore,
have more students. In turn, schools that charge higher co-payments, are located at more
distance from the centroid of the county where thestudent lives, and are single-gender
schools tend to be less preferred by parents and, therefore, have less students.
It is worth noting not only those characteristics that are statistically signicant, but
also the characteristics that are not signicantly related to school selection. In this
category we nd that having more educated and richer parents or the teaching of values
have no signicant eect on choice. IN addition, in general, we nd that most government
programs have no eect on choice, controlling on other school atributtes. We only present
estimates for the eect of extended hours on school choice, but we have tried with several
other public transfers, such as participation in the P-900 program (a government program
focused on providing inputs to low performing schools, see Clay, McEwan, and Urquiola,
2005 for more details on this program), the size of local government transfers to public
schools, and a proxy of whether students in the school are elligible or not for free lunch.
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In order to have a sense of the economic signicance of these estimates, we estimate
the amount of money each household is willing to pay for increases in dierent school
attributes, using our IV estimates from column (2). We nd that a one-standard devia-
tion increase in test scores is valued at about $8.7 of monthly copayment. Interestingly,
this estimate is of the same order of magnitude than the estimate by Bayer et al. (2006)
for the San Francisco Bay Area. An increase of one standard deviation of discipline in
the school is valued at about $1.3 of the monthly copayment. Preferences for distance
from the school to the student house are interesting too. A school located close to a
subway station is valued at about $4.8 of monthly copayment. Similarly a one standard
deviation decrease of the distance from school to the centroid of the county in which the
student lives (roughly, a 2 Km decrease in distance or 5 minutes decrease in traveling
15See discussion in footnote 7.
16time) is valued at about $11.8 of monthly copayment. Overall, these estimates suggest
that the two attributes with the highest valuations are distance to school and test score
outcomes.
These results present resemblance to a number of recent studies on school choice
in the Chilean system. Using data for a sample of students from basic and secondary
education, Chumacero et al. (2008) present evidence that parents are willing to travel
long distances when they are oered a high test score school (notice, however, that a
limitation of this study is that they do not control for the school price). Both Gallego
and Hernando (2008) and Elacqua (2009), using reduced form estimatation techniques
applied to dierent samples, nd that parents tend to put positive and big weights on
test scores when choosing schools.
Table 4 presents the results of estimating (6), i.e. the model with interactions between
school and student characteristics in order to study whether there are heterogeneous
preferences for school attributes depending on observable student characteristics. The
most important results that we want to highlight are the following. First, more educated
and richer parents tend to put more weight on average education and income in the
school, respectively. Second, parents that value the teaching of religious values seek
schools that oer this attribute and are actually willing to pay more for it in terms of
distance. The two previous results suggest that parents tend to value schools in which
other parents have similar backgrounds to them. Third, as in the paper by Hastings et
al. (2005), richer parents tend to put more weight on average test scores and are willing
to travel longer distances to attend these schools. Interestingly, there seems to be a
negative correlation between the valuation of average test scores and distance: parents
that put more weight on test scores are, at the same time, less aected by the distance
to school. Fourth, test scores and discipline in the school seem to be less important for
female students, while the teaching of religious values, the school being for girls only, and
the existence of extended hours in the school seem to be more important for parents of
17girls. Finally, parents with more expectations about their kids' education achievement
tend to put more weight on test scores, peers, and actually are more willing to spend
money and time in the schools they choose. Overall, the main conclusion from this table
is that heterogeneity in preferences is very important for the school choice process.
The implications of heterogeneity in student preferences for school attributes can
be observed in Figure 1. Figure 1 presents the distribution of the marginal eects of
each attribute on the likelihood of choosing a particular school. As it is evident, all
attributes present a high level of heterogeneity. At the same time some parents seem to
be indierent about some characteristics that are highly valued for some other group of
parents. Take for instance the case of having extended hours and the valuation of the
mean education level of parents in the school. Our main estimates imply a 0 eect, but
at the same time it is possible to observe schools facing big positive marginal eects on
these two attributes. In general, for this two attributes, the distribution of the marginal
eects of most attributes is clustered around or close to zero with some schools facing
a lot of weight on some particular attribute of the school and many of them facing
enrollment responses close to 0 for some of the same attributes.
5.1 Selection from the Supply Side
A very important potential concern related to these results is to what extent these
patterns may represent selection of students from the supply side. Table 5 presents
estimates of the model splitting the sample using two variables of school selection. The
rst is an indicator taken from the parents' survey that describes whether the school
has selection policies or not, the second uses the size of school (assuming that bigger
schools tend to be more selective). Using these two criteria, we split the sample of
schools between those above and below the median of these variables. The results do
not support the view that the interaction patterns identied in the previous tables change
signicantly when estimated in high- and low-selection schools.
18We start discussing the selection variable constructed from the 2005 SIMCE survey.
The survey asked parents whether they or their children were subjected to a selection
process in one or more of four dierent dimensions comprehending requirements of: (i)
an income statement, (ii) a proof of religious membership (e.g. baptismal certicates),
(iii) a pre-entry test, and (iv) a pre-entry parent interview. Contreras et al. (2007) report
that 31% of all students face some selection in one or more of these four dimensions.
In particular, 27% of students had to take a pre-entry test (48% of students attending
private voucher schools and 5% of students attending public schools), while 12% of
parents were required to attend a pre-entry interview (23% of parents in private voucher
schools and only 1% of parents in public schools) and 10% faced selection for religious
reasons (all of them in voucher schools). Almost nobody reported being asked an income
statement or nancial report.
All in all, this data shows that, while there is some selection process going on, there is
remarkably very little selection from the school side: if one discards the religious motive
that, a priori has very little to do with the standard reasons for selecting students by
schools, only 36% of the schools apply some selection process to more than 25% of their
students.
As a robustness check we matched the schools in our sample (SIMCE 2002) with
the schools in the 2005 sample16 and used the available information about selection in
schools in 2005 as a proxy for the existence of such policies in 2002. Our assumption is
that the decision by schools of applying a selection process (and in which dimensions to
apply it) to their students is a relatively stable one, thus the 2005 variables should be a
very good proxy for the information we don't have on selection in 2002.
With these variables we tried several splits of the sample using: (i) the percentage
of parents that report being subjects to some type of selection, and (ii) the number of
criteria applied by the school on its average student. To try to separate the religious
16The match is not perfect though, as a result, the available sample is reduced. Thus, Table 5 also
includes a column with the estimation for the whole reduced (i.e. matched) sample.
19consideration, that we do not believe should be correlated with academic ability or
the cost of receiving an education, we repeated the splits above without considering
religious requirements as part of an active selection process.17 Table 5 shows the results
for two of these splits,18 namely schools above and below the median of the number of
criteria applied to the average student, these estimations essentially don't dier from
those presented in Table 4. In particular the rst order eects of both test-scores and
distance are still signicative and of the same sign and similar size to those in the
estimation for the whole sample. At the same time, the interactions keep the general
pattern observed so far: students with higher income, more educated parents, and from
families that consider religious values as being of particular importance tend to value
those characteristics more and, thus show some tendency to cluster together.
Of special interest is the fact that the interactions with parents' expectations about
their ospring future educational attainment show very similar patterns at both sides of
every single split: parents that expect their kids to get some tertiary education exhibit
very similar preference patterns for school characteristics, regardless of whether they
chose a selective or a non-selective school for their children to attend.
6 Attribute Demand Elasticities and Attribute Supply: An
Application
In this section we present a reduced-form application of our estimates that shows how
the kind of parameters we estimate can be used to inform policy or to shed some light on
relevant theoretical questions. In particular, we ask ourselves whether there is some ev-
idence that schools respond to a demand that is more sensitive to a particular attribute
17Religious selection refers mostly to Catholic schools. In Chile, according to the 2002 census, 70% of
the population 15 years and older are Catholic, it's hard to argue then that selection in this dimension
could result from some cream-skimming scheme.
18Other splits we tried include student level data (e.g. schools where more than 50% of the parents
report at least two selection criteria vs. schools where less than 50% of the parents report two or more
selection criteria) and non-partition splits (e.g. schools where 75% or more of parents report some
selection vs. schools where 25% or less of parents report some selection). The results, available from
the authors upon request, aren't very dierent from those presented here.
20by adjusting the supply of said attribute. This question is relevant because, if schools
don't adjust their particular product to the demand responsiveness then hastened com-
petition (as introduced by a voucher system) won't have an eect on school quality.
Even more, some other types of interventions, like giving parents better information
about school quality hence making demand more responsive to that particular school
trait, would only have a reduced impact in school eort in particular and educational
output in general. These exercises are similar in spirit to Bayer and McMillan (2005).
We begin by estimating a proxy for the demand responsiveness for one particular
school attribute as seen by the individual school, this proxy is just the derivative of each





























We expect a given school to be willing to oer more of an attribute the more: (1) the
demand increases with the increase in the attribute (i.e. larger jk), (2) the administators
or owners of the school benet from this increase in enrollment, and (3) the marginal cost
of increasing the attribute is not above the increase in revenues. Thus, other things equal,
we would expect schools that face more responsive (larger and positive jk) demands to
oer higher level of those attributes and also that this eect will be larger for privately
owned (i.e. voucher) schools than it is for public schools (since administrators of public
schools don't benet directly from having large enrollments).
We use the proxy we have for the enrollment response to attribute changes for each
school to study whether schools respond to these \elasticities" and identify for which
attributes the response of schools seem to be bigger. To do so, we estimate the following
21regression:
xjk = 0 + 1^ jk + W
0
j2 +jk; (13)
where Wj is a vector of controls and jk is a random shock.
Table 6 presents the results, with bold gures indicating statistically signicant re-
sults. In each case we present the standardized response of each attribute to a one-
standard deviation increase of the enrollment response to each attribute in each school.
Results suggest that the bigger impacts are related to the response of test scores and
discipline to its enrollment responses, with extended hours being also statistically sig-
nicant. These results are interesting because they suggest that the supply response of
schools to these attributes is particularly high, even though we observe a lot of hetero-
geneity in the actual enrollment elasticities.
Taking advantage of the fact that the 2005 SIMCE test presents test scores for fourth
graders in that year, we further study the eects of the enrollment-test score responses
in the change of the test scores between 2005 and 2002. We estimate the following
regression:





in which the dependent variable is the change in test scores between 2002 and 2005,19
we include the initial test score level (t02
j ) as a control expecting to capture a possible
mean reversion eect. Results are presented in Panel B of Table 6 and suggest that
the enrollment elasticity has a positive eect on the increase in test scores. This result
conrms the previous result on the relevance of the eect of the test scores-enrollment
response on test scores. Finally, Panel C in Table 6 studies whether the response of the
school to the attribute varies accordingly to whether the school is public or privately
owned. Previous papers have identied that voucher schools tend to react more to
school competition than public schools as a consequence of their dierent incentive
19These gures are comparable because the 2005 and 2002 SIMCE tests scores were equated by the
Ministry of Education to represent actual contents knowledge and not only relative knowledge in the
cross section.
22structures and rigidities (Gallego, 2006). Our results conrm this presumption: the
reaction of voucher schools is bigger than the reaction of public schools to increases in
the test scores-enrollment response. Moreover, the estimated eects for public schools
are statistically insignicant.
These results are related to estimates of the eect of competition or school market
power on test scores, reported in papers such as Bayer and McMillan (2006) for the
San Francisco Bay Area, and to estimates for Chile for the late 1990s in Gallego (2002,
2006), Contreras and Mac as (2002) and Auguste and Valenzuela (2004). The estimated
impact is of the same order of magnitude of the estimated eects in these other paper and
conrm the negative eect of market power in the school supply on education quality,
as measured by test scores.
Overall, results in this section suggest that enrollment elasticities estimated in the
main section of this paper are, non-mecahnically, related to school responses. Moreover,
results suggest that schools do respond to the incentives provided by higher levels of
expected responses of enrollment to attributes, such as test scores and discipline. In
particular, in the case of test scores the responses seem to be high and statistically
signicant in particular for voucher schools, which have both more exibility and better
incentives to respond to the enrollment elasticities.
7 Conclusions and Future Directions
The potential eects of school vouchers and school's market power on student outcomes
have been a much debated topic in the US and elsewhere. Our study of the demand
side of the Chilean voucher system, which has operated for more than 20 years in the
complete K-12 system, can help us to understand the eects of vouchers on educational
outcomes. This paper presents estimates of the demand side of school choice trying to
study the school attributes considered at the moment of choosing schools and how these
valuations change depending on students and family characteristics. Good estimates
23of these preferences are key to understand the eects of increased choice on school
responses.
The allocation of students to schools is allowed to vary with household's own char-
acteristics. Our results imply that households value some characteristics of schools, as
expected: average test scores, the teaching of values in the school, the discipline of the
school, the gender composition of the school, the monetary cost of the school, and a mea-
sure of the distance and accessibility of the school from each household. Interestingly,
our results also suggest that the valuation of each characteristic depends on household
characteristics. The main two results imply that: (i) students tend to be allocated in
equilibrium with students with similar backgrounds in terms of income, human capital,
and preferences for the teaching of values and (ii) parents with higher expectations on
the educational attainment of their children value more the academic characteristics of
schools and have smaller price elasticities (considering both copayments and distance).
The last result is consistent with a model in which investment in schooling is more prof-
itable for more capable children. We present some evidence that the determinants of
the school choice do not vary in a signicant way if we compare highly selective schools
with the other schools. This result suggests that the patterns we identify in the data
are more correlated with demand than with supply decisions, which is consistent with
some recent survey evidence for Chile.
In addition, our estimates allow us to compute the average enrollment elasticity with
respect to all school attributes that each school faces. We also nd a high degree of
heterogeneity in the estimates, at the school level. This heterogeneity allow us to cor-
relate the implicit elasticities each school faces with its oered level of each dimension.
As expected, we nd that schools `react' to higher elasticities of a particular attribute
by increasing the supply of the attribute in equilibrium. Moreover, our results suggest
that some of the attributes seem to respond a lot to the demand elasticity for them. In
particular, by increasing the test scores-enrollment elasticity by one standard deviation
24increases test scores oered by the school increase by about 0.22 standard deviations
(about 0.11 standard deviation when including controls for socioeconomic characteristics
of the students attending the school). Most of the other attributes react in a positive
way but the eects are smaller than the eect on average test scores. Moreover, addi-
tional results suggest that the test scores-enrollment elasticities are positively correlated
with the increase in test scores, with the size of the eects being of the same order
of magnitude, i.e. normalized responses of between 0.12 and 0.16 standard deviations.
Moreover, the reaction of schools is signicantly bigger for voucher schools, which have
both more exibility and incentives to react to changes in enrollment.
Our results do not imply that selection or segregation are not relevant issues in
the Chilean case. Rather, our results can be interpreted as evidence that a signicant
share of this phenomenon seems to be related to self-selection and a signicant degree of
heterogeneity in preferences for dierent school attributes. In addition, our results also
imply that some schools do react signicantly to the incentives coming from the demand
side in the form of the reaction of enrollment to changes in the attributes oered by
the schools. In terms of policy implications, our estimates mainly imply that there is
a potential role for government action to increase the eective degree of choice parents
exercise. For instance, a good example of a government intervention along these lines is
the implementation of NCLB in the Charlotte county by restricting the choices parents
can make. Another family of policies are related to interventions at the supply side that
help eliminating low-performing schools or a potential role for superintendencies that
control outcomes. The second policy implication is related to the nding that schools
seem to react to the incentives that they face and, therefore, it is not that schools do not
react strongly to incentives, but that they do not face strong enough incentives to oer
a high level of quality. Putting it dierently, if preferences were such that all parents
would put strong emphasis on test scores, some schools would react strongly to this
incentive.
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28A Computational Appendix









where Aj is the set of students that actually attend school j and Pij is the probability
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sdiqzis +  diq)
(16)
After solving problem (15) we obtain the rst step estimators of (;  ;) and the s that
constitute the LHS variable of the second step. We discuss how these estimators are
obtained below.
A.1 Computation of the Log-Likelihood Function and Scaling of variables
Since the probability calculated in L involves an exponential function in both the numer-
ator and the denominator, it's very easy for the calculation to exceed the computational
representation of the machine if one doesn't take the precaution of previously scaling
the variables. To solve this problem we scale every variable so that it lies in the interval
[ 1;1].
A.2 Solving for  and reducing the size of the problem
As stated, problem (15) would require us to nd a maximizer for a function of J +
(R + 1)S + 1 parameters. Where R is the number of school characteristics (in our case,
9) and S is the number of household characteristics (in the problem in hand, 6), the
(S+1) extra parameters correspond to the distance between schools and students and
the interaction of this distance with household characteristics. Since J = 1175 in our
29sample, directly solving (15) using a numeric algorithm would imply a nonlinear search
in I R1;236, something that is clearly infeasible in computational terms.
Recall that, as stated in the text, for a given set of estimators (;  ;) the rst






Pim = 0 8m = 1;2;:::;J (17)
and that we can always nd a set of estimators  that simultaneously satisfy all these




















It should be noticed though, that there are multiple solutions for (18). In fact, it is
easy to verify that, for any  that is a xed point of (18) then the vector  =  + a1
for an scalar a and 1 a vector of ones of size J is also a xed point of (18). So we require
a normalization. Without loss of generality (since we include a constant in our second
step regression), we set 
1 = 0 thus immediately reducing the set of xed points of (18)
to one.
A direct consequence of us being able to readily solve for  for any given set of
estimators of the other parameters is to greatly reduce the dimensionality of (15). In
eect, since now we can rewrite  = (;  ;) then the maximum likelihood problem
can be restated as one that only requires us to search over (;  ;) and implicitly
solve for . This problem now involves a non-linear search in I R61, still a dicult task
(if we were to use non-derivative methods) but a feasible one.
20Where sm is the observed share of school m in the sample
30A.3 Finding an optimum for (;  ;)









The good news about this problem is that it can be solved using derivative methods
like BHHH that are (at least in the early stages of the search) much faster than non-
derivatives method like the Nelder-Mead Simplex method. The bad news is that doing







































































































































and thus maximize L using the faster derivative methods. In particular, we use BHHH
which requires knowledge of the gradient of the objective function but not its Hessian.21
We use a relatively coarse stopping condition for the BHHH method and, afterwards,
use the Nelder-Mead Simplex method to further bound an optimum.
Although we see no reason to think that the conditions for global convexity of the
logit function don't hold in our case, we try several starting points to be sure that we
always converge to the same optimum. In particular, we try as starting points: (1) an
all zeroes vector, (2) an all ones vector, (3) a randomly generated point in the unitary
ball in I R61. In all three cases we converged to (qualitatively) the same point.
A.4 Summary of the Estimation Algorithm
No matter what optimization algorithm one chooses (BHHH, BFGS, DFP, et c etera),
the basic algorithm is always the same:
1. Given a guess  for the optimum, if  satises the ending condition go to 6.
2. Compute f() and rf().
3. Compute an approximation for the Hessian of f(), A.
21Which of the various variations of the Newton-Raphson method one uses is a matter of taste. See
Judd(1998) for a detailed discussion of the dierent methods available.
324. Find a new candidate point  =  + h  A 1rf() for some h > 0 such that
f() > f(), if such a point doesn't exist, set  =  and exit reporting that an
optimum could'n be found.
5. Set  =  and go to 1
6. Report a (candidate to an) optimum at .
Here (as always) the only complication is in step 2. Computing the value of the
likelihood function and its gradient at  = (;  ;) requires the following steps:
1. Find (;  ;) that satisfy the rst order conditions in (17). To do this:
(a) Start with a suitable guess 0 (we tipically use the  from the previous step).
(b) Compute Pij from (18) using t and (;  ;).
(c) Compute the implied predicted share ~ sm = 1
I
PI








mj > " for some 0 < "  1 then set t = t+1 and go to 1b
(f) Set m = t
m   t
1 8m = 1;2;:::;J.
2. Given (;  ;), compute Pij from (16), L from (15) and rL from (20).




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 3: Estimation Results
(1) (2)






Mother education 0.21 0.03
(4.70) (0.23)




Extended hours 0.02 0.01
(2.55) (1.24)








Estimation method OLS IV
Instruments - Attributes from
the 6 closest schools
t-statistics in parentheses. Constant not-reported.
37Table 4: Interaction Eects
Student Variables
School Variables Coe. Std. Err. Z-Stat
Inc. per Cap.
Inc. per Cap. 1.085 0.035 30.74
Moth. Educ. 0.329 0.011 29.91
Test Scores 0.273 0.030 9.21
Rel. Values -0.027 0.006 -4.64
Subway -0.116 0.030 -3.85
Distance 1.006 0.035 28.92
Mother's Education
Moth. Educ. 0.091 0.001 63.81
Test Scores -0.014 0.004 -3.35
Distance 0.178 0.007 26.32
Mother's Age
Inc. per Cap. 0.440 0.055 7.94
Moth. Educ. 0.068 0.006 10.63
Copayment -0.583 0.109 -5.36
Distance 0.381 0.029 13.07
Female
Test Scores -0.110 0.019 -5.90
Copayment -0.570 0.104 -5.45
Discipline -0.395 0.018 -21.71
Rel. Values 0.064 0.006 11.16
JEC 0.007 0.001 5.97
Single Gender 0.076 0.002 34.32
Subway -0.125 0.032 -3.89
Religious Values
Test Scores 0.374 0.042 9.00
Rel. Values 0.701 0.008 83.72
Subway -0.126 0.057 -2.21
Distance 1.246 0.064 19.41
High Expectations
Inc. per Cap. 1.283 0.050 25.63
Moth. Educ. 0.149 0.008 19.04
Test Scores 0.293 0.020 14.69
Copayment 1.410 0.100 14.13
Subway 0.083 0.028 2.96
Distance 0.701 0.051 13.67
38Table 5: Controlling for Selection from the Supply Side
Selection Criteria School Size Selectivity Index
Above Median Below Median Above Median Below Median
Coe Z-stat Coe Z-stat Coe. Z-stat Coe. Z-stat
Average Income 1.47 1.36 1.70 2.55 -0.62 -0.85 4.18 4.33
Avg. Mother Educ. 0.09 0.63 0.15 2.92 0.31 4.25 0.06 0.75
Test Scores 0.91 2.95 0.27 1.92 0.44 2.32 0.92 4.72
Copayment -15.74 -5.75 -20.95 -9.72 -13.49 -6.15 -28.49 -9.17
Discipline 1.24 4.42 0.05 0.42 0.69 3.92 0.32 1.93
Religious Values -0.34 -4.40 -0.05 -1.09 -0.09 -1.77 -0.18 -2.78
Full Day 0.00 -0.22 0.03 2.60 0.01 0.52 0.03 2.23
Single Gender -0.09 -2.67 -0.05 -2.17 -0.07 -2.88 -0.12 -3.73
Subway 0.84 2.24 1.21 6.49 1.34 5.73 0.52 1.87
Distance -10.68 -129.51 -10.81 -139.87 -10.30 -119.91 -11.24 -146.80
Income per Cpita
Average Income 0.87 6.32 2.32 20.53 1.26 13.17 3.35 18.39
Avg. Mother Educ. 0.44 13.56 0.14 7.11 0.35 15.25 0.05 1.96
Test Scores 0.01 0.19 0.26 5.03 0.10 1.99 0.44 6.52
Copayment 1.30 5.34 -1.01 -4.67 0.06 0.35 -1.78 -5.45
Religious Values 0.00 -0.32 -0.04 -3.79 -0.03 -3.20 -0.01 -0.31
Subway -0.19 -3.12 -0.10 -1.76 -0.16 -3.21 -0.10 -1.40
Distance 0.79 10.06 0.94 13.92 0.75 11.48 0.74 8.24
Mother's Education
Avg. Mother Educ. 0.09 29.94 0.09 41.16 0.09 34.56 0.09 35.86
Test Scores 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -2.99 0.00 -0.28 -0.02 -2.86
Subway -0.01 -0.78 0.01 0.99 -0.02 -1.67 0.00 0.22
Distance 0.16 10.80 0.20 14.20 0.21 14.69 0.12 8.42
Mother's Age
Average Income 0.54 4.75 0.31 3.27 0.50 5.45 0.36 2.95
Avg. Mother Educ. 0.09 6.43 0.06 5.59 0.06 5.39 0.07 5.42
Copayment -0.94 -4.80 -0.26 -1.23 -0.74 -4.07 -0.60 -2.45
Subway -0.01 -0.31 0.04 1.03 0.02 0.43 0.00 0.05
Distance 0.26 4.26 0.56 9.60 0.33 5.62 0.41 6.62
Female
Test Scores -0.41 -11.96 0.04 1.12 -0.22 -6.99 -0.03 -0.94
Copayment 0.05 0.30 -0.81 -4.05 -0.25 -1.60 -0.97 -3.85
Discipline -0.62 -18.15 -0.28 -9.98 -0.53 -16.71 -0.28 -8.76
Religious Values 0.13 13.56 0.01 1.35 0.06 6.74 0.06 5.18
Full Day 0.01 3.33 0.01 2.62 0.01 6.00 0.00 1.27
Single Gender 0.09 24.09 0.07 15.67 0.05 13.48 0.13 31.04
Subway 0.02 0.32 -0.22 -4.04 -0.15 -2.68 -0.02 -0.36
Religious Values
Test Scores 0.37 4.41 0.21 2.68 0.27 4.12 0.27 2.55
Copayment 0.33 1.15 0.27 0.92 -0.06 -0.27 1.27 2.45
Religious Values 0.72 46.96 0.73 43.34 0.68 49.53 0.78 36.81
Subway -0.21 -2.10 0.07 0.62 -0.06 -0.71 -0.08 -0.52
Distance 1.05 8.14 1.35 9.64 0.91 8.11 1.43 7.81
High Expectations
Average Income 1.28 12.76 0.85 9.82 1.20 14.79 1.01 8.88
Avg. Mother Educ. 0.17 10.08 0.17 14.22 0.16 12.09 0.17 11.67
Test Scores 0.26 7.02 0.31 9.24 0.30 9.38 0.31 8.16
Copayment 0.48 2.56 2.65 12.41 1.51 8.49 1.67 6.81
Subway 0.04 0.78 0.05 0.97 0.10 2.13 0.01 0.26
Distance 0.75 7.25 0.74 7.42 0.88 8.33 0.50 5.04
Schools 297 878 486 689
Students 34434 34335 34456 34313
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